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A B S T R A C T
We are the first to examine the impact of gender diversity on banks' boards on the probability and
size of public bailouts. Our findings, based on a sample of listed European banks over the period
2005–2017, suggest that banks with more gender-diverse boards are less likely to receive a public
bailout and receive a lower amount of bailout funds as a percentage of total assets than banks
with less gender-diverse boards. Specifically, an increase by one standard deviation in gender
diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by at least 2.44%, a significant reduction con-
sidering that the unconditional probability is 18.7%. Gender diversity is also positively related to
bank performance, as proxied by ROA and Tobin's Q and with dividend payout ratios, consistent
with the hypothesis that female directors are better monitors than male directors. These results
are robust to a variety of econometric approaches and provide support for recent reforms in
several EU countries regarding gender quotas.
1. Introduction
When there is a very difficult situation, women are called in to do the work. To sort out the mess.
Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB
Does gender diversity in boards affect bank conduct? Are banks with a significant presence of women on their board of directors
more or less likely to need a government bailout during banking crises? These are the two questions that this paper seeks to answer.
Gender diversity might affect the probability of bank bailouts because female directors might affect firm profitability and risk, two
important determinants of the probability that a bank will receive a public bailout.1 The impact on firm performance can be ascribed,
among other things, to a monitoring channel: female directors are likely to exert stronger monitoring efforts than their male
counterparts, and this might increase performance for firms with weak governance mechanisms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This
prediction is confirmed by recent contributions focusing on European firms (Bennouri et al., 2018; Green and Homroy, 2018).
Because of this monitoring channel, gender diversity might also affect dividend policy. For example, Chen et al. (2017) show that in
firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms, female directors tend to increase payout ratios.
Moreover, female directors are likely to be more risk averse than their male counterparts, which might lead to a decrease in
financial distress costs and systemic risk (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012) and, in turn, a decrease in the probability that the bank
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needs a public bailout. However, the existing literature about the impact of gender diversity on bank risk lacks consensus: for
example, while Palvia et al. (2015) and Farag and Mallin (2017) provide evidence of a negative impact of gender diversity on bank
risk, Berger et al. (2014) find a positive association, and Adams and Ragunathan (2017) and Sila et al. (2016) provide evidence that
the relationship is insignificant. The reason for such discrepancies is likely to be due to the sample under consideration (for example,
US rather than European banks) as well as the different econometric techniques used. In particular, Berger et al. (2014) focus only on
German banks, while Palvia et al. (2015), Sila et al. (2016) and Adams and Ragunathan (2017) focus on US banks. Similar to our
paper, Farag and Mallin (2017) consider European banks. In terms of methodology, Farag and Mallin (2017) rely on dynamic panel
data models to allow for endogeneity. However, Farag and Mallin's sample period is shorter than ours (2004–2012), and they focus
only on credit risk (measured by the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans). Importantly, none of these studies considers the role of
gender diversity in determining the probability of bank bailouts, and ours is the first study to use a combination of techniques
(including PSM and IV regressions based on external instruments) to examine the role of gender diversity on three different risk
proxies: the NPL ratio, Z-score, and the probability of receiving a bailout. Our paper is also the only one that controls for systemic
risk.
In this paper, we are the first to provide evidence on the influence of women on banks' boards on the probability of receiving a
public bailout and the size of the bailout. This is a timely question for bank regulators and academics alike because of the public
discontent that has arisen both in the US and in Europe with respect to the use of taxpayers' money to prop up illiquid banks. Several
recent papers investigate the determinants of government bailouts of banks (among others, Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012, and
Berger et al., 2016), but to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that seeks to determine the role of gender diversity.
We investigate public bailouts in EU banks for two reasons. First, the Eurozone crisis has protracted the period of financial
instability in Europe that started with the 2007–2008 financial crisis: we focus on a sample period from 2005 to 2017, which includes
the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis (2010−2012), consistent with the recent literature on policy interventions for banks (Fiordelisi and
Ricci, 2016). This allows us to study a longer time series than for the US.
Second, although US and EU-member states rescue programs share many similarities in dealing with the financial crisis, there
exist important institutional differences in both the supervisory approach to bank distress and in central banking features, providing
fertile ground for novel research.2 In particular, we are able to exploit information on a broad range of public bailouts (capitali-
zations, guarantees and credit lines), while studies based on US data consider only equity capital injections through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP, Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012).
Investigating gender diversity in EU banks is important because although many EU-member states introduced both legal in-
struments and voluntary gender quotas to promote gender equality in decision-making positions (De Cabo et al. 2012, Ahern and
Dittmar, 2012) during the early 2000s, only a few banks have met the targets (European Banking Authority (EBA), 2016a). To address
this issue, and in line with the requirements of Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, the EBA and the European Se-
curities and Market Authority (ESMA) issued joint guidelines (ESMA and EBA, 2017). These guidelines introduced the requirement
for financial intermediaries to set up a diversity policy and establish a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender on
their boards.
Moreover, while the empirical literature on the impact of board diversity on bank performance and/or bank risk tends to focus on
one country (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014), we examine a sample
of banks located in 15 EU countries. By investigating a cross-country sample, our study captures a higher degree of heterogeneity than
the previous literature (for example, Berger et al., 2016) in terms of institutional, socioeconomic and cultural factors that may affect
corporate governance in banks. In this respect, our paper is close to Arnaboldi et al. (2018), which investigates the relationship
between gender diversity and bank performance. However, Arnaboldi et al. (2018) do not focus specifically on the impact of gender
diversity on the likelihood and size of public bailouts. Moreover, our sample is more homogeneous than the sample in Arnaboldi et al.
(2018) in terms of the regulatory framework and economic development because we concentrate on banks from Western European
countries in the EU, while Arnaboldi et al. (2018) include Switzerland (which is not in the EU), the Czech Republic, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania (which are not in Western Europe).
Investigating the determinants of bank bailouts, as opposed to investigating those of other proxies for bank risk and performance,
is important for three reasons. First, bank bailouts are a less arbitrary measure than other proxies of bank risk and performance. In
fact, while there can be a variety of proxies for risk and performance, bank bailouts can simply be expressed by a binary variable (one
for bailouts and zero otherwise). Therefore, this measure is less subject to data mining than other proxies for risk and performance
and is also less likely to be affected by different bank business models and managerial discretion in financial reporting. Second, for
each bailout, we can retrieve the type of bailout and the bailout amount (in billions of euros). This allows us to quantify the cost of the
bailouts and how gender diversity can reduce/increase such costs, which may help inform public policy. Third, the probability and
size of bank bailouts can also depend on risk-shifting and monitoring, and therefore, examining the impact of gender diversity on
bank bailouts can help us understand to what extent gender diversity influences risk-shifting and monitoring incentives in banks.
2 For example, due to the widespread fragmentation and market-orientation of the US banking system, US supervisory agencies are generally
inclined to enforce Prompt Corrective Actions (PCAs), while European supervisors tend to exercise forbearance to avoid bank runs (Dermine and
Schoenmaker, 2010). Moreover, the Federal Reserve supported financial institutions individually during the financial crisis, while the Eurosystem's
authorities, as well as the Bank of England, focused on liquidity extension measures (Stolz and Wedow, 2010). In addition to these discrepancies, the
two frameworks diverge in terms of the treatment of depositors in the resolution process and approaches used to address bank distress (Danisewicz
et al., 2018).
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Institutional discrepancies between the EU and the US banking systems are very important for the contribution of this paper to the
existing literature on public bailouts. For this reason, we now provide a brief account of the main features of the EU institutional
framework with respect to bank rescue packages.
The recent financial crisis revealed drawbacks in the EU banking system, both at the member-state level and at the aggregate
level, because of the absence of a comprehensive Pan-European regulatory and legal framework for the financial sector (De Larosiére
Group report, 2009). These shortcomings led to the creation of the new European supervisory system, namely, the Banking Union
(BU). The BU is based on three pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and the
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).3
In response to the crisis, EU countries launched rescue measures to address funding problems in banks, to restore confidence in the
financial system and to limit the negative externalities of bank distress. The Member States allocated more than €30 billion to support
financial institutions in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin). European
action plans consisted of three types of bailout measures: capital injections, credit lines, and guarantees. Each of these rescue-
packages had a specific aim. Capital Injections, the most common form of bailout packages in the aftermath of the last financial crisis
(Philippon and Schnabl, 2013), aim to strengthen the banks' capital and to ensure the correct functioning and financing of the wider
economy. Guarantees on deposits and debts aim to calm markets in an effort to lower risk premia. European governments used
Guarantees extensively during the crisis period because they did not have to be recorded in the public budget, nor did they require any
explicit legislative process. Finally, Credit Lines are employed in particular cases to enhance the liquidity position of impaired banks.
Importantly, the amount of bailout funding received by the banks in our sample is a staggering €2182 billion: €280 billion for capital
injections, €353 billion for credit lines, and €1549 billion for guarantees.
Table 1 reports the amounts of the public bailouts during the period 2008–2017 for the banking systems in our sample. There are
no public bailouts from 2005 to 2007. In total, there were €793 billion spent on recapitalizations, €4334 billion spent on guarantees,
and €263 billion spent on credit lines. Therefore, our sample covers approximately 40.48% (€2182/€5390) of the total amount of
public bailouts to banks in our sample countries.
To answer our research questions, we use a unique dataset on the boards of directors and ownership structures of 105 listed banks
in 15 European Union countries, including data on the presence of female directors and government officials on the board and the
presence of institutional shareholders. The data on the corporate governance variables were hand-collected from annual reports and
cross-checked with Board-Ex.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that an increase in gender diversity on banks' boards decreases the probability of a
public bailout. These findings are robust to a variety of specifications, including the use of probit and logit models with different types
of fixed effects (henceforth, FE), as well as duration models. The robustness of our results is confirmed when we employ propensity
score matching (PSM) techniques and instrumental-variable (IV) regressions to allow for potential endogeneity. Second, employing
IV-Tobit and panel Tobit regressions to allow for left-censoring of the data, we find that banks entering the financial crisis with a more
gender-diverse board need less public funding than banks with less gender-diverse boards, in the form of capital injections, credit
lines and guarantees, although the results for capital injections are less robust.
We are also the first to document the mechanism through which board diversity may affect the probability of receiving a bailout.
We find that gender diversity on bank boards improves bank performance as proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA. However, we do not find
evidence that gender diversity on banks' boards affects bank risk, as proxied by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans or Z-
score. In line with Chen et al. (2017) and Ye et al. (2019), we find that banks with more gender-diverse boards have higher payout
ratios than banks with less gender-diverse boards. These findings suggest that gender diversity enhances the monitoring of bank
executives.
Our contribution to the previous literature is twofold.
First, we provide evidence that the economic impact of gender diversity on the probability of a bailout is substantial: an increase
by one standard deviation in the percentage of female directors (12.3 percentage points) leads to a reduction in the probability of a
bailout (in the form of capital injections, credit lines or guarantees) by at least 2.44 percentage points (0.1203*0.2025). This re-
duction is economically significant considering that in our sample, the unconditional probability of a public bailout is approximately
18.7% from 2008 to 2013, the period when most of the bailouts (95% of the sample) take place, and 9.6% over the total sample
period (2005–2017).
Second, previous empirical studies focus on bailouts in the form of capital support, overlooking that governments use different
tools to restore financial stability (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013; Berger et al., 2016). However, public authorities use a variety of
bailout measures to address generalized distress in the banking system (Dewatripoint, 2014). For instance, governments make use of
guarantees, either for deposits to prevent market panic or for debt securities to lower risk premia in capital markets. These alternative
mechanisms are understudied, despite the fact that guarantees have been extensively used by governments. Our results suggest that
banks with more gender-diverse boards receive a lower amount of guarantees than banks with less gender-diverse boards. For
3 The SSM confers to the European Central Bank (ECB) supervisory powers over banks that are deemed to be of “significant” importance for the
Euro-Area, while the national supervisory agencies are in charge of supervisory activities of banks outside of the SSM framework. The SRM manages
the resolution process for banks in distress with the aim to reduce the cost of bank bailouts to the taxpayer by improving banks' incentives to operate
prudently (De Haan et al., 2009). The EDIS, which was introduced in 2015, is supposed to complement national deposit guarantee schemes
(DGS).The main objective of EDIS is to reduce the extent to which national DGS are vulnerable to local shocks and to mitigate the two-way feedback
effects between sovereign credit risk and banks (Acharya et al., 2014).
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instance, according to the IV-Tobit regressions, an increase by one standard deviation in the proportion of women on the board
(0.1203) decreases the ratio of guarantees to total assets by 0.457 percentage points (0.038*0.1203). Because the banks in our sample
have average total assets equal to approximately 250 billion euros, this implies a reduction in the average amount of guarantees equal
to (0.00457*250 =) 1.14 billion euros.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses that relate gender diversity in the boardroom to the
probability of bank bailouts. Section 3 describes the dataset and the methodology. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5
provides a discussion of the mechanism through which gender diversity affects the probability of a bailout. Section 6 concludes the
paper and provides policy recommendations.
Table 1
Public bailouts in EU-15 countries during the period 2005–2017.
Member state 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Panel A: Capital Injections
Belgium 12.90 5.00 2.50 0.00 2.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.50 13.53 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Germany 99.33 11.00 0.65 2.70 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 12.50 52.06 26.05 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.78 0.78 0.78
Greece 5.00 0.00 10.00 0.47 20.28 0.86 12.37 10.61 0.00 0.00
Spain 0.00 0.00 101.10 0.00 72.55 0.61 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 23.45 0.50 2.70 0.00 2.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 3.82 0.00 11.29
Luxembourg 2.40 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 26.55 0.00 11.09 0.00 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria 15.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 3.22 21.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 0.00 4.00 0.00 8.00 14.25 1.10 4.90 2.58 0.00 5.89
Finland 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.33 4.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 64.15 47.59 2.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Guarantees
Belgium 275.75 1.00 0.00 27.20 21.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 580.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany 447.75 2.50 0.00 5.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 376.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Greece 15.00 0.00 40.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.00 93.38 93.00
Spain 200.00 0.00 1.15 0.00 119.65 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 319.75 0.00 0.00 16.40 17.33 29.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 150.00 175.10
Luxembourg 4.50 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 200.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria 75.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 5.64 3.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 16.00 0.45 0.00 19.00 5.22 3.60 0.00 28.17 24.67 22.80
Finland 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 156.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 364.53 67.91 3.27 0.00 23.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Credit Lines
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 4.94 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Greece 8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.74 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 30.00 0.00 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.28
Luxembourg 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 52.90 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 39.89 4.49 7.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
This table provides information on the institutional setup of the national schemes over the sample period from 2008 to 2017 in EU-15 countries.
Panels A, B, and C report information on capital injections, guarantees, and credit lines, respectively. From 2005 to 2007, no bailouts were reported.
All values are in billions of euros.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/state_aid_approved_2008_2017_final.xlsx
G. Cardillo, et al. Journal of Corporate Finance xxx (xxxx) xxxx
4
2. Hypotheses development: gender diversity and public bailouts
The recent literature investigates the factors affecting the likelihood that banks will receive a public bailout (Faccio et al., 2006;
Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016) and, specifically, the effects of governance mechanisms
on bailout probability (Vallascas et al., 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature neglects gender diversity on
banks' boards as a factor that may affect the probability of a public bailout.
Board diversity can have both benefits and costs. Diversity broadens the array of perspectives on the board (Erhardt et al., 2003),
leading to a larger number of potential solutions. Moreover, board diversity improves the degree of heterogeneity of functional
expertise (or unique skills), which can in turn improve advisory effectiveness (Kim and Starks, 2018). Board diversity can also result
in new personal connections, for example political connections or investors from a different demographic background. Diversity may
nonetheless be costly because it can result in communication problems among subgroups and create conflict (Ferreira, 2011).
However, some of the literature suggests that conflicts might improve collective decisions because they lead to a stricter scrutiny of
board members (Cumming et al., 2015).
We argue that it is plausible that gender diversity may affect the probability that a bank receives a bailout. This hypothesis stems
from the previous literature, which posits that gender diversity in boardrooms affects economic outcomes (i.e. Adams and Ferreira,
2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). In particular, female directors may influence both bank profitability and risk (Matsa and Miller,
2013; Berger et al., 2014) and ultimately, the probability that the bank receives a public bailout.
The risk-taking channel is important because the decision to rescue a bank depends mainly on the financial distress costs and
systemic risk of that bank (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), and female directors tend to be more risk averse and less confident than
their male counterparts (Bordo et al., 1994; Arch, 1993; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Huang and Kisgen, 2013).
Therefore, gender diversity may reduce bank risk-taking and ultimately, the probability that a bank needs a public bailout to avoid
liquidation.
A second channel through which gender diversity may reduce the probability of a public bailout is performance because a key
determinant of a public bailout is bank profitability (Dam and Koetter, 2012). Female directors tend to monitor more strongly than
male directors, and gender diversity tends to improve the sensitivity of the executive compensation and CEO turnover to firm
performance. Moreover, gender diversity tends to improve the performance of firms with weak governance mechanisms (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009).
Empirical contributions on the association between gender diversity on the board and firm profitability provide mixed findings,
both in the management literature (Kramer, 1991; Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2002; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Francoeur
et al., 2008; Adams and Funk, 2012) and in the finance literature (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Cheng, 2008; Adams and
Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Liu et al., 2014), probably due to discrepancies in the institutional and legal environments
of different countries. In particular, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) find a positive impact of gender diversity on the profitability
of Spanish firms. Similar results are provided by Francoeur et al. (2008) and Liu et al. (2014) for Canada and China, respectively. In
contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) provide evidence of a negative relationship between gender
diversity and firm profitability.4 Finally, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) show that gender diversity on the board of UK companies does
not affect firm performance.
In addition to these two channels, gender diversity on boards may also play a role in bank dividend policy. Dividend payouts can
be used as a monitoring device to decrease agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Onali et al., 2016; Chen
et al., 2017) because dividends decrease the amount of excess cash that insiders can invest in projects with a negative net present
value (Jensen, 1986). Chen et al. (2017) report that gender diversity on corporate boards increases the payout ratios of firms with
weak governance structures, indicating that female directors use dividends to decrease agency costs. However, Chen et al. (2017)
focus on nonfinancial firms. The recent literature finds that the relationship between bank dividend policy and corporate governance
variables is subject to dynamics that differ from those typical of nonfinancial firms (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Onali et al.,
2016). In particular, banks may pay dividends to shift default risk to bank creditors and, in the case of bailouts, to taxpayers (Acharya
et al., 2011; Onali, 2014).
Empirical contributions on the relationship between gender diversity in boards and risk provide conflicting findings (Matsa and
Miller, 2013; Sila et al., 2016). For example, Berger et al. (2014) find a positive association between gender diversity in the executive
board and bank risk in Germany, while Adams and Ragunathan (2017) and Sila et al. (2016) do not find any significant association
between gender diversity and bank risk in the US. It is important to emphasize that the inconsistencies in these results may be due to
different factors, such as the proxy for risk used, the country under examination, and the type of bank examined. For example, Sila
et al. (2016) focus on large listed companies (including bank holding companies) in the US, while the sample used in Berger et al.
(2014) consists mainly of unlisted German banks. Moreover, the results for nonfinancial firms may not be valid for banks because
banks tend to have different governance arrangements (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Mulbert, 2010).5
4 Recent contributions provide two potential explanations for a negative relationship: women may exert stronger monitoring efforts than men,
leading to an increase in monitoring costs and a decrease in profitability (Adams and Ferreira, 2009); women may be less experienced, on average,
than men (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012).
5 Monitoring conducted by a variety of stakeholders complicates the governance of financial institutions. For instance, bank regulators can act on
the behalf of depositors, and the government can actively seek to monitor bank conduct (Onali et al., 2016). Additionally, bank instability can lead
to severe negative externalities (Adams and Mehran, 2003).
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These considerations suggest that ex-ante the relationship between gender diversity on banks' boards and the probability of a
public bailout is unclear:
H1a. Banks with more gender-diverse boards are less likely to receive a public bailout than banks with less gender-diverse boards.
H1b. Banks with more gender-diverse board are more likely to receive a public bailout than banks with less gender-diverse boards.
Hypotheses H1a and H1b are concerned with the probability of a bailout. However, we can also develop similar hypotheses about
the size of the bailout received by a bank. Because bank size can affect the overall amount of a bailout, we focus on the size of the
bailout scaled by total assets.
3. Data and methodology
This section describes the methodology and data. Section 3.1 describes our econometric strategy. Section 3.2 describes our
dataset. Section 3.3 provides the descriptive statistics.
3.1. Methodology
3.1.1. Estimating the probability of a bailout
To test our hypotheses, we first use a broad definition of public bailout that includes any kind of last-resort measures used by
public authorities to support ailing banks. To this end, we build the variable Public Bailout, defined as a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if bank i receives a public bailout at time t and zero otherwise.
In further tests, we distinguish among different kinds of bailouts:
• Capital Injections: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if capital support is provided for bank i at time t and zero otherwise
(Berger et al., 2016);
• Guarantees: a dummy variable that takes the value one if one or more guarantees are provided for bank i at time t and zero
otherwise;
• Credit Lines: a dummy that takes the value one if bank i receives a favoured credit line from the government at time t and zero
otherwise.
Past studies mainly document the importance of capital injections (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013; Berger et al., 2016) as the core of
rescue programs. However, in Europe, guarantees played a very important role. In contrast to capital injections, guarantees are not
required to be shown in public budgets or to be allotted after an explicit legislative process. For these reasons, they were used
extensively during the financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
To test H1, we rely on a probit model, in line with the previous literature on bank bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006; Bayazitova and
Shivdasani, 2012):
=E Bailout Gender Diversity Controls Gender Diversity Controls[ , ] ( , )i t i t i t, , 1 , 1 (1)
where i = 1,2, …N labels banks, while t = 1, 2…T labels the year. To reduce simultaneity concerns, we consider the explanatory
variables lagged by 1 year. We cluster the standard errors at the bank level to correct for serial correlation in the errors within each
bank.6Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time t (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; De
Cabo et al., 2012), and Controls is a vector of bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables to allow for country-level time-
varying factors that may affect bailout probability.
We choose the variables to include in the vector Controls on the basis of the previous literature on bank bailouts (Faccio et al.,
2006; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Berger et al., 2016, Vallascas et al., 2017). In line
with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) perspective (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990), we control for bank size, measured as the log of total assets
(Size).7 For robustness, we use as an alternative proxy for systemic risk, the long run marginal expected shortfall (hereafter, LRMES),
an extension of the marginal expected shortfall (Vallascas et al., 2017).8 We also control for the market-to-book ratio (MTB Ratio), a
common proxy for growth opportunities, and for bank profitability, proxied by ROA and Tobin's Q. The former is defined as the net
income of the bank divided by total assets (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014). The latter is measured as the ratio of the
market value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the face value of the debt (Lindenberg and
Ross, 1981; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Onali et al., 2016).
We also allow for the potential impact of the bank's funding structure and asset composition in the baseline model or in the
robustness checks: Capital Ratio, defined as bank equity capital to total assets (Gropp et al., 2011; Acharya and Thakor, 2016); Tier 1
6 We cluster the standard errors at the bank level in our baseline regressions because clustering at the country level may result in biased standard
errors because the number of clusters is small (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
7 As well as being a rough indicator of a bank's systemic relevance (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2013), Size is also a proxy for market power and a
measure of diversification (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Gropp et al., 2011).
8MES is defined as the one-day loss expected if market returns are< 2%, and it is measured as of 31 December of a given year (Acharya et al.,
2012). Data on this variable are no longer available from the V-Stern Lab website, and only data for LRMES are available.
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Ratio, defined as the Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012); Deposits Ratio, defined as the ratio of
deposits divided by total assets9; Liquid Assets Ratio, calculated as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets (Wang
et al., 2009); and Derivatives to Assets Ratio, which is the amount of derivatives scaled by total assets (Bayazitova and Shivdasani,
2012). We control for ownership concentration, which may decrease bank risk according to some of the literature (Iannotta et al.,
2007): we use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (hereafter, HHI), calculated as the sum of squared ownership shares for each recorded
shareholder.10
It is important to control for other corporate governance variables that might correlate with Gender Diversity, to reduce the
probability of omitted variable bias. For this reason, we also include Board size (ln) (the log of the number of board members) and
Board Independence (the number of independent directors11 divided by the number of board members), following the previous
literature (Erkens et al., 2012; Vallascas et al., 2017). We also control for the presence of a female CEO (Faccio et al., 2016), using a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is female and zero otherwise (Female CEO).
Moreover, politically connected banks might be more likely to attract public attention and receive a public bailout than banks that
are not politically connected (Faccio et al., 2006). For this reason, we also include among our control variables in the probit re-
gressions a dummy equal to one if there is a government official on the board (Onali et al., 2016). We call this variable Political
Connection. To further increase the robustness of our results, we also control for the presence of institutional investors12 in the
ownership structure of the bank using the variable Institutional Ownership (Diaz and Jafarinejad, 2016).
Finally, we also consider an array of country-level variables commonly used in the banking literature as controls. This is necessary
because bailout policies and bank performance could be influenced by institutional and macroeconomic factors (Faccio et al., 2006;
Gropp et al., 2011). We control for the annual GDP growth (real) to allow for business cycle effects at the country level (Anginer et al.,
2014). To capture changes in the probability of a bailout due to financial crises, we include two dummy variables: US-Mortgage Crisis
Dummy, which takes the value one for the years 2007 and 2008 (and zero otherwise), and EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Dummy, which takes
the value one for the period from 2010 to 2012 and zero otherwise (Erkens et al., 2012; Arellano et al., 2012).
3.1.2. Propensity score matching (PSM) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions
Studies about corporate governance mechanisms might suffer from endogeneity problems (Coles et al., 2012). In our case, there
could be reverse causality between public bailouts and Gender Diversity: when a bank receives a bailout, dismissals of executives and
board replacements may ensue (Berger et al., 2016). Moreover, in our specifications, we may be omitting unobservable variables that
are correlated with board composition. First, reverse causality could drive our results due to the so-called sorting-effect: better-
performing banks are more likely to hire female directors on their board than other banks (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and bank
performance might affect the probability of a bailout. Second, provided that women are indeed more risk averse than men, it is
plausible that women can self-select onto the boards of less risky banks. Finally, there may be factors that are unobservable to the
econometrician and correlated with Gender Diversity, engendering an omitted variable bias problem (Coles et al., 2012).13
It may also be argued that rescued banks and non-rescued banks differ systematically because of the variables whose impact might
be confounded with the effect of Gender Diversity. For this purpose, we employ a PSM approach to eliminate these differences. In
particular, we first split the sample into two groups – banks with high levels of Gender Diversity and banks with low levels of Gender
Diversity – on the basis of the median value for Gender Diversity. Then, we match the banks of the two groups within the country strata
so that the two subsamples are similar as possible in terms of the variables that might be correlated with the probability of being
rescued. This procedure reduces the likelihood that such underlying differences (for example, differences in terms of size) are driving
our results, rather than Gender Diversity. In particular, our PSM contains variables that might be related to bank risk and bank
performance, such as Tier 1 Ratio and ROA, as well as other variables that might affect the probability of a bailout, such as Political
Connection.
We follow Fang et al. (2014) and rely on a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if Gender Diversity is higher
than the sample median and zero otherwise. This probit regression includes all the bank-specific controls used in our main regres-
sions: Size, Capital Ratio, Deposits Ratio, MTB Ratio, ROA, Tier 1 Ratio, HHI, Female CEO, Board Size (ln), Board Independence, Political
Connection and Institutional Ownership. We also require a tolerance level for the maximum propensity score distance (caliper) between
the treatment and the control group equal to 0.05; this is comparable to the values used in recent contributions about corporate
governance in banks (among others, Ivashina et al., 2008). Once obtained the treatment and control groups, we rerun the probit
regressions as in Eq. (1), allowing for country FE and year FE.
As an additional robustness check, we employ an IV-probit model based on a two-stage approach:
9 By scaling deposits by total assets, we measure the degree to which the bank's activities depend on deposits funding (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997;
EBA, 2016b).
10 In the specifications related to the mechanism, we also employ the dummy variable Widely Held, which is an indicator variable equal to one if
there is no owner with>10% of bank share rights and zero otherwise. This variable has been employed previously in the literature about bank risk
taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009).
11 To identify independent directors, we follow the same criteria used by Onali et al. (2016).
12 We distinguish among four different kinds of institutional investors: (i) mutual funds, (ii) banks, (iii) pension funds, and (iv) hedge funds.
13 Other previous studies on bank risk (Sila et al. (2016); Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Faccio et al., 2016) employ a dynamic panel data model
using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, this approach can lead
to bias in the presence of time-varying omitted variables (Wintoki et al., 2012).
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=STAGE Gender Diversity f IV Controls1: ( , )i t i t i t, 1 , 1 , 1 (2a)
=STAGE E Public Bailout Gender Diversity Controls Gender Diversity Controls2: [ , ] ( , )i t i t i t, , 1 , 1 (2b)
where Public Bailout is the probability that a bank receives a public bailout and Controls is a vector of control variables.
IV-estimation methods rely on two assumptions: the relevance restriction requires that the instrument affects the potentially
endogenous variable (Gender Diversity), and the exclusion restriction requires that the instrument is not directly correlated to the
dependent variable (Public Bailout). To choose an appropriate instrument, we need to search for a source of exogenous variation in
our main variable of interest, Gender Diversity. We borrow the idea for our instruments from Knyazeva et al. (2013) and Chen et al.
(2017), who show that local labor-market conditions affect board composition. We identify two instruments based on regional labor-
market characteristics: Female Participation Rate, which is the female labor force participation divided by the male labor force par-
ticipation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank's headquarter is located, and Female Participation Rate, which is calculated as the
employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 where the bank's headquarter is located. Both of these instruments
are likely to be positively correlated with Gender Diversity, and therefore they satisfy the relevance restriction, a necessary condition
for instrumental variables to be valid.
Female Participation Rate is based on the total number of women who are economically active in a particular region, and one may
argue that this could be a weak instrument because the board of directors tends to consist of highly qualified individuals. For this
reason, we also consider Female Employment Rate, which measures the educational attainment of women, focusing on the regional
employment rate of women with only tertiary education.
The second necessary condition for the validity of our instruments is that they do not have any first-order effect on our dependent
variable. Because the percentage of women in the local labor market is unlikely to have a direct impact on the probability that a
specific bank will experience financial distress, this variable plausibly satisfies the exclusion restriction. While it is true that female
directors might choose to join high performing banks or banks with low risk (e.g., De Cabo et al., 2012), the percentage of women in
the local labor market is unlikely to be correlated with the riskiness and performance of individual banks whose headquarters are in
that region. In fact, the banks in our sample are large listed banks, for which geographical diversification occurs at the national (and
possibly international level). For this reason, it is unlikely that local labor-market conditions play an important role in the probability
that a bank will be in distress (and vice versa). It may be argued, however, that the economic conditions of the country where the
bank has its headquarters can affect the soundness of the bank, especially for countries for which there is a feedback effect between
sovereign debt risk and the risk of the domestic financial sector (Acharya et al., 2014), and excluding this variable from the analysis
may generate omitted variable bias. For example, if economic growth is positively related to female labor participation and em-
ployment rates, then the banks located in countries with high GDP growth rates may be more likely to have a high value for Gender
Diversity than banks in other countries For this reason, we address potential omitted variable bias by controlling for national GDP
growth rate in our regressions (GDP growth).
Using regional labor-market characteristics is also superior to using national labor-market characteristics because it reduces the
probability that the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable depends on other national-level variables that
are omitted from the analysis. In fact, one may argue that national-level labor-market variables may be important factors in the
decision-making processes of national governments when assigning bailouts to local banks. However, this last point is (in our view)
rather weak because a bailout cannot be granted without the approval of the European Commission (in particular, the Directorate
General for Competition), which needs to consider potential distortions in competition resulting from a bailout (Dewatripoint,
2014).14 In fact, EU authorities have to implement a concerted action plan for bank rescue measures to avoid national measures
impairing the functioning of the single market because of potential distortions in competition (Stolz and Wedow, 2010; Calderon and
Schaeck, 2016). For example, in 2009, the European Commission launched an investigation in the restructuring plan for Dexia to
verify whether it was consistent with European Commission Treaty rules.15
3.1.3. Duration models
As a robustness check, we conduct survival data analysis to estimate the impact of gender diversity on the probability that a bank
receives a bailout (Cox, 1972, Cleves et al., 2016, Chen et al., 2017). We employ both a Cox hazard model16 and a parametric Weibull
regression, and we estimate the probability that bank i has received a bailout since the start of the financial crisis.17 More specifically,
we implement the following regression setup:
14 It may be argued that national programs requiring gender quotas for boards mandated by EU-15 governments (or other authorities) could be
exploited as exogenous shocks that could be used as instrumental variables or for a difference-in-differences approach. However, as we show in
Supplementary Appendix B, in most cases these quotas were for state-owned companies or companies with state ownership; therefore, they were not
binding for listed banks. Moreover, in some cases there were no specific sanctions for noncompliance. Italy is the only country for which the gender
quotas apply to listed banks, the implementation took place during our sample period and there are specific sanctions for noncompliance. In this
case, we do observe an increase in the number of sample banks during the first phase of the implementation of the gender-quota program. However,
during the second period of the program, only two banks were compliant with the new gender quota.
15 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-399_en.htm?locale=en.
16 The Cox proportional hazard model (1972) is less restrictive than the full parametric probit regression since it requires fewer assumptions and
fits better smaller samples (Cleves et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017).
17 If a bank received more than one public bailout during the crisis, we consider the date of the first bailout.
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We estimate the probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number of years starting from the beginning of the crisis to
the end of the sample period as well the mean value of the variable of interest, Gender Diversity (and other control variables), across
the pre-bailouts period (2005–2007). Furthermore, to demonstrate the robustness of our results, instead of using macroeconomic and
institutional factors (see Section 3.1.1), we consider country fixed effects (Country FE) in the specification. In further tests, we also
estimate the probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number of days starting from the beginning of the crisis to the end
of the sample period.
3.1.4. Tobit regressions for the size of the public bailout
Gender Diversity may affect not only the probability of receiving a public bailout but also the amount of funding granted to the
bank. In particular, we consider for each specific type of public bailout the total amount of funding scaled by total assets (Public
Funds). Clearly, this is a censored variable because
=Public Funds f Gender Diversity Controls( _ , )j i t j i t j i t, , , , 1 , , 1
= >Public Funds Public Funds Public Fundswhere if 0
0 otherwisej i t
j i t j i t
, ,
, , , ,
(4)
where j= 1,2, 3 labels the specific type of public bailout (Capital Injections, Credit Lines or Guarantees), i= 1,2, …N labels banks, and
t = 1, 2…T labels the year. The vector Controls is defined as before.
To test whether Gender Diversity affects the amount of funding granted to the bank, we employ IV-Tobit models, with the same
instruments as for the IV-probit regressions above, as well as panel censored regression models (Honoré, 1992; Arena and Kutner,
2015), which allow for the estimation of limited dependent variables in the presence of panel FE. As a further robustness test, we also
run Poisson models (with fixed effects and population average models).
3.2. Data and sample selection
To test our hypotheses, we build a new and unique hand-collected dataset with information on all public bailouts and board
composition for listed banks in 15 EU countries during the period from 2005 through 2017. Concentrating the analysis on listed EU
banks is useful for improving the within-sample comparability of the banks from different countries because these banks have to
comply with IFRS and the market for their shares tends to be liquid.18
Our sample selection steps are as follows. In the same vein as Onali et al. (2016), we select all banks defined by Bankscope as
commercial banks, bank holding companies (BHC), or cooperative banks. Second, we consider only listed banks that adopt Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to avoid confounding effects from differences in national accounting standards. Next,
we select all banks for which information on total assets is available for at least one of the sampled years (resulting in 118 banks).
Finally, we exclude financial institutions for which data on regulatory and other financial ratios are unavailable (13 banks) over the
sample period. The final sample consists of 105 banks and covers the largest banks in EU-15 countries. In the multivariate regressions
below, some of the 105 banks exit the sample, and the exact number of banks entering each regression depends on the specification
employed.
Table 2 Panel A reports the composition of our sample by country. Table 2 Panel B provides an analysis of the sample re-
presentativeness in relation to the population of the listed banks in the EU-15 countries over the sample period. While we select only a
subsample of banks in EU-15 countries, our sample covers> 90% of the entire European Banking System in terms of total assets,
deposits and total lending.
Our sample representativeness is similar to that in Arnaboldi et al. (2018), who examine a sample of 77 listed banks across 20
countries. Our sample consists of 105 banks and 15 countries, and thus, we have a larger sample in terms of the number of banks (and
a higher average number of banks per country). The two samples are very similar in terms of the total assets of the banks in the
samples (approximately 24 trillion euros).
For our econometric analysis, we match data collected from multiple data sources. The data on public bailouts until 2013 were
obtained from the document “Public Support Measures in Europe and in the United States”, which is available on Mediobanca's website
(http://www.mbres.it/en/),19 the European Commission Database,20 and the Global Trade Alert from CEPR website. We also con-
ducted keyword-based searches using Lexis-Nexis. In line with previous studies (among others, Faccio et al., 2006), we combined the
name of the rescued banks with keywords such as: “bailout,” “bail-out,” “bailed out,” “rescue,” “rescue package,” “injection,” “re-
structure”, “restructuring”, “aid,” “liquidity facilities” and “guarantees”, along with the Boolean operator AND to consider the words
18 These considerations are consistent with those put forward by Laeven and Levine (2009), who select an international sample of large banks
because “Focusing on the largest banks enhances comparability because they tend to comply with international accounting standards and have more liquid
shares, reducing concerns that accounting or liquidity differences drive the results.” (p. 261).
19 This document can be found at the link: https://www.mbres.it/sites/default/files/resources/download_it/rs_Piani%20di%20stabilizzazione
%20finanziaria.pdf
20 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition.html.
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“government” or “state” (for example, “government bailout”). Furthermore, we replicated the same search strategy by directly using
the main national newspapers of each sampled country.
Bank-specific variables were collected from either Bankscope up to 2013 and Orbis Bank Focus thereafter (balance sheet and
income statement items) or V-Stern-lab (LRMES). Information on macroeconomic and institutional factors was obtained from the
AMECO database of the European Commission and the World Bank Database.
Tables 3 reports the summary statistics (mean, median, minimum and maximum) for each variable used in the subsequent
multivariate analysis (all variables are winsorized at the 1% level) for the whole sample period (2005–2017). We also report the
statistics for the proxies of bank performance, risk, and dividend payout ratios and a short explanation for each variable (we provide a
more detailed explanation in Section 6). The mean and standard deviation for Gender Diversity are 14.98% and 12.03%, respectively.
Female Participation Rate ranges between 70.70% and 98.48%, while Female Participation Rate ranges from 43.60% to 92%, suggesting
a substantial variation in the extent to which women are involved in the social and economic environments in Europe (European
Commission, 2012a, 2012b).
Table 4 reports the pairwise correlations of the main variables (dependent and independent) in our analysis. The probability of
receiving a bailout is negatively correlated with accounting-based and market-based measures of performance, such as ROA, Tobin's
Q, and MTB Ratio. Distance-to-default, proxied by Z-score, is negatively related to the probability of a bailout and thus Capital Ratio.
However, the correlation between Tier 1 Ratio and Public Bailout is insignificant. Banks with high systemic risk (proxied by LRMES)
and large banks are more likely to receive a bailout, which is consistent with the previous literature. The dummy variable Political
Table 2
Sample composition and representativeness.
Panel A: Overview















United Kingdom 9 8.41
Total 105 100.00
Panel B: Sample representativeness
Year Size (th)a Loans (th) Deposits (th)
2013 Sample (€) 23,298,505,109 9,843,846,495 9,045,624,892
All listed banks (€) 24,229,329,832 10,352,703,424 9,403,368,359
Representativeness (%) 0.96 0.95 0.96
Sample (€) 23,298,505,109 9,843,846,495 9,045,624,892
All banks in EU-15 (€) 46,653,506,422 21,379,781,685 18,586,373,465
Representativeness 0.50 0.46 0.49
2015 Sample (€) 23,521,241,029 10,203,214,410 9,867,628,892
All listed banks (€) 23,941,763,624 10,563,046,898 10,063,161,700
Representativeness (%) 0.98 0.97 0.98
Sample (€) 23,521,241,029 10,203,214,410 9,867,628,892
All banks in EU-15 (€) 48,780,527,597 23,499,578,558 21,264,567,217
Representativeness (%) 0.48 0.43 0.46
2017 Sample (€) 22,148,876,792 9,893,047,617 9,948,230,704
All listed banks (€) 23,613,551,402 10,790,652,567 10,579,760,857
Representativeness (%) 0.94 0.92 0.94
Sample (€) 22,148,876,792 9,893,047,617 9,948,230,704
All banks in EU-15 (€) 46,360,876,882 22,667,439,304 20,740,555,549
Representativeness (%) 0.48 0.44 0.48
The table reports the sample composition (Panel A) and representativeness (Panel B). Sample representativeness is calculated for 2013, 2015, and
2017. We report the percentage of total assets, total loans, and total customer deposits covered by our sample with respect to the population of listed
institutions in the 15 countries considered and the population of listed and unlisted banks in the sample countries.
a (th) stands for thousand of euros.




Description Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Key dependent variables for the main hypotheses
Public Bailout 1 if the bank was bailed out, and 0 otherwise. 1290 0.0961 0.0000 0.2949 0.0000 1.0000
Capital Injections 1 if the bank received a public capital injection, and 0 otherwise. 1290 0.0333 0.0000 0.1796 0.0000 1.0000
Credit Lines 1 if the bank received a credit line from the government. 1290 0.0186 0.0000 0.1352 0.0000 1.0000
Guarantees 1 if the bank received a guarantee from the government. 1290 0.0651 0.0000 0.2468 0.0000 1.0000
Public funds (Capital
Injections)
Amount of the capital injection received by the bank scaled by total
assets (excluding zeros).
49 0.0193 0.0150 0.0126 0.0006 0.0348
Public funds (Credit Lines) Amount of the credit line received by the bank scaled by total assets
(excluding zeros).
27 0.0092 0.0112 0.0015 0.0006 0.0125
Public funds (Guarantees) Amount of the guarantee received by the bank scaled by total assets
(excluding zeros).
84 0.0533 0.0352 0.0179 0.0001 0.1264
Dependent variables used to explore the mechanism
Tobin Market Value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the
book value of equity plus the face value of debt.
1169 1.0279 0.9925 0.1666 0.7237 2.1844
NPL Ratio Nonperforming loans to total loans. 708 0.0087 0.0005 0.0362 0.0000 0.2603
Z-score Sum of return on assets (ROA) and the equity capital to total assets
ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA.
976 51.806 28.123 69.081 −0.381 404.690
DPE Dividends paid for a given year divided by bank equity. 1212 0.0246 0.0015 0.0454 0.0000 0.2790
Potentially endogenous explanatory variable
Gender Diversity The percentage of female directors on the board. 1211 0.1498 0.1250 0.1203 0.0000 0.4667
Instruments
Female Participation Rate Female labour force participation (unit: thousands of people)
divided by male labour force participation (unit: thousands of
people) in the NUTS 2 region where the bank's headquarter is
located.
1259 0.8525 0.8469 0.0701 0.7070 0.9948
Female Employment Rate Employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2
region where the bank's headquarter is located.
1205 0.7779 0.7840 0.0552 0.6530 0.8610
Other corporate governance variables
Female CEO 1 if the bank CEO is female, 0 otherwise. 1227 0.0293 0.0000 0.1688 0.0000 1.0000
Board Size Number of board members. 1232 13.8815 13.0000 5.4996 5.0000 34.0000
Board Independence Proportion of independent directors on the board. 1183 0.5181 0.5333 0.2843 0.0000 1.0000
Political Connection 1 if there is at least one government representative on the board 1289 0.1001 0.0000 0.3002 0.0000 1.0000
Ownership variables
Institutional Ownership Fraction of total equity held by institutional investors 1290 0.0509 0.0169 0.0795 0.0000 0.4970
HHI Sum of squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of
the bank.
1199 0.2905 0.1474 0.3258 0.0000 1.0000
Widely Held 1 if there is no owner with > 10% of bank share rights, and zero
otherwise.
1184 0.2466 0.0000 0.4312 0.0000 1.0000
Other control variables
Size Logarithm of total assets. 1203 17.3689 17.5216 2.3850 12.1975 21.4449
LRMES Marginal contribution of the bank to the expected shortfall of the
financial system in a left-tail (crisis) scenario.
926 41.3926 42.8850 14.3106 5.6700 71.2900
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 1096 1.1321 0.8375 1.0371 0.0126 6.7054
ROA Net-income to total assets. 1203 0.0069 0.0048 0.0239 −0.0651 0.1460
Capital Ratioa Equity capital to total assets. 1192 0.0926 0.0672 0.0973 0.0000 0.6257
Tier 1 Ratio Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 1173 0.1088 0.1050 0.0639 0.0003 0.3450
Deposits Ratioa Deposits divided by total assets. 1100 0.4698 0.4760 0.1932 0.0101 0.8928
GDP growth Gross domestic product annual growth rate. 1290 0.7731 1.4160 2.5482 −7.3005 5.9889
This table reports the summary statistics for all the variables used in our empirical analysis. We also report a short description of the variables. The
sample period goes from 2005 to 2017. For each variable, we report the following statistics: the number of observations (“Obs”), mean (“Mean”),
median (“Median”), standard deviation (“Std. Dev.”), minimum value (“Min”), and maximum value (“Max”). Information on public bailouts was
collected from the following sources: Mediobanca's website, Global Trade Alert's website, the European Commission's website, Lexis-Nexis, and the
websites of national newspapers of the countries under examination. Bank-specific information was collected from Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus
with the only exception of LRMES (Long run Marginal Expected Shortfall), which was obtained from the V-stern Lab website. Information on bank
ownership structure was collected from Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
a The reason for such low values for the column “Min” for Deposit Ratio is that several banks in the sample have a Deposits Ratio lower than 2%.
For example, Fortis/Ageas, which was bailed out in 2008, had a Deposits Ratio equal to 0.3279 in 2006, 0.3011 in 2007, and 0.0016 in 2008, when it
received a bailout. Similarly, there are some outliers for Capital Ratio. For example, Lloyds Banking Group Plc had a bailout in 2008, when this ratio
was 2.2%. One bank in our sample, Laan & Spar Bank A/S, had a Capital Ratio of 0.000012, which rounds up to 0%. Disposing of these banks would
create a sample selection bias because one of the potential determinants of the probability of a bailout is undercapitalization.




Public Bailout Tobin's Q NPL Ratio DPE Z-score Gender Diversity Female CEO Board Size (ln)
Tobin −0.0792
0.0067
NPL Ratio −0.0175 −0.0412
0.6427 0.2814
DPE −0.0848 0.3951 −0.1241
0.0031 0.0000 0.0010
Z score −0.1781 0.0354 −0.2517 −0.0221
0.0000 0.2783 0.0000 0.4939
Gender Diversity −0.1035 0.1119 −0.1326 0.0614 0.1130
0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0347 0.0005
Female CEO −0.0420 −0.0272 −0.0447 −0.0006 0.0721 0.1216
0.1419 0.3575 0.2373 0.9829 0.0268 0.0000
Board Size (ln) 0.0881 −0.1872 −0.0452 −0.1270 0.0429 −0.0498 −0.0096
0.0020 0.0000 0.2323 0.0000 0.1872 0.0808 0.7377
Board Independence 0.0037 −0.0808 −0.2022 0.0429 0.0420 0.2945 0.0015 −0.1456
0.8989 0.0069 0.0000 0.1481 0.2024 0.0000 0.9592 0.0000
Political Connection 0.1016 −0.0979 −0.0478 −0.1127 0.0144 −0.0151 −0.0081 0.2723
0.0003 0.0008 0.2045 0.0001 0.6552 0.5955 0.7778 0.0000
Institutional Ownership −0.0260 0.0696 −0.1284 0.2367 −0.0404 0.1837 0.0801 −0.0540
0.3512 0.0173 0.0006 0.0000 0.2111 0.0000 0.0050 0.0581
Size 0.1360 −0.3064 −0.2103 −0.1445 0.0443 0.2226 0.0212 0.5414
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1704 0.0000 0.4682 0.0000
LRMES 0.2465 −0.1691 0.2513 −0.1291 −0.2802 0.0649 −0.0007 0.0542
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0490 0.9842 0.1002
MTB Ratio −0.1568 0.6055 −0.0442 0.4652 0.0157 0.0311 0.0007 −0.2888
0.0000 0.0000 0.2710 0.0000 0.6417 0.3079 0.9825 0.0000
ROA −0.1422 0.5865 −0.2824 0.2764 0.0986 0.0770 −0.0142 −0.1810
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0083 0.6282 0.0000
Capital Ratio −0.1131 0.4230 0.0080 0.0951 −0.0096 −0.0663 −0.0339 −0.2706
0.0001 0.0000 0.8330 0.0010 0.7652 0.0235 0.2488 0.0000
Tier 1 Ratio −0.0200 −0.1312 −0.1100 −0.1353 0.1272 0.3219 0.0537 −0.1003
0.4940 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0699 0.0007
Deposits Ratio −0.0611 −0.1669 0.1434 −0.0801 −0.0616 −0.1117 0.0164 −0.1999
0.0428 0.0000 0.0002 0.0079 0.0678 0.0002 0.5929 0.0000
Widely Held 0.0832 −0.0207 −0.0544 0.0171 −0.0273 −0.0224 −0.0682 0.1357
0.0042 0.4892 0.1521 0.5641 0.4098 0.4427 0.0195 0.0000
HHI 0.0767 0.1289 0.1566 −0.0597 −0.1050 −0.2318 −0.1053 −0.0961
0.0079 0.0000 0.0001 0.0423 0.0014 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010
GDP growth −0.3179 0.1292 −0.2046 0.1537 0.1739 0.1721 0.0610 −0.0603
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0327 0.0345
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Connection is positively correlated with Public Bailout and Size, while it is negatively correlated with Tobin's Q, confirming that
government intervention might occur in large underperforming banks. Banks whose ownership is dispersed (as proxied by Widely
Held) tend to be more likely to receive a bailout than other banks. However, HHI is positively correlated with Public Bailout. Because
HHI and Widely Held are clearly negatively correlated (−0.332, significant at the 1% level), these two variables capture different
features of the degree of concentration of ownership. Finally, GDP growth is negatively correlated with Public Bailout, which confirms
the importance of that country-specific characteristic.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
In this section, we report the descriptive statistics focusing on the distributions of our main explanatory variable, Gender Diversity,
and our main dependent variable, Public Bailout. Table 5, Panel A reports the average and maximum number of female directors, the
average and maximum value for Gender Diversity and the number of bailouts by country, while Table A, Panel B reports the same
statistics for each year in our sample. Moreover, Figs. 1 and 2 graphically report the trend over time for the average value of Gender
Diversity and the number of bailouts.
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that there are 12 countries in our sample – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,







Size LRMES MTB Ratio ROA Capital Ratio Tier 1 Ratio
Political Connection −0.0608
0.0365
Institutional Ownership 0.1452 −0.0695
0.0000 0.0126
Size 0.1743 0.0519 0.2683
0.0000 0.0722 0.0000
LRMES 0.0908 −0.0545 0.1598 0.4531
0.0068 0.0973 0.0000 0.0000
MTB Ratio −0.0487 −0.1405 0.1507 −0.2813 −0.1209
0.1160 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
ROA 0.0175 −0.0858 0.0796 −0.2038 −0.2124 0.3703
0.5580 0.0029 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Capital Ratio −0.1588 −0.0365 −0.1085 −0.5396 −0.2194 0.1562 0.4780
0.0000 0.2075 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Tier 1 Ratio 0.0424 0.0342 −0.1003 −0.0606 0.0383 −0.1250 −0.0911 −0.0689
0.1587 0.2421 0.0006 0.0394 0.2556 0.0000 0.0019 0.0191
Deposits Ratio 0.0106 0.0629 −0.1452 −0.3639 −0.1455 −0.0455 −0.1595 −0.1073 0.1219
0.7336 0.0372 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1476 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001
Widely Held 0.1494 −0.0860 0.0961 0.2140 0.1641 −0.0501 −0.0335 −0.0739 −0.0990
0.0000 0.0031 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1058 0.2592 0.0131 0.0010
HHI −0.1947 −0.0508 −0.2367 −0.1748 −0.1634 0.0123 0.0680 0.0353 −0.0998
0.0000 0.0786 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6871 0.0213 0.2340 0.0008
GDP growth 0.1197 −0.0937 0.1249 0.0678 −0.1784 0.2295 0.2052 −0.0270 0.0309
0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3522 0.2908





GDP growth −0.0307 −0.0137 −0.1495
0.3086 0.6385 0.0000
This table reports the pairwise correlation rates of the main variables for the period from 2005 to 2017. Public Bailout is a dummy variable equal to
one if the bank was bailed out and zero otherwise. Tobin's Q is the market value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the book value of
equity plus the face value of debt. NPL Ratio is calculated as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. DPE is calculated as the dividends paid in
a given year divided by total equity. ROA is net income scaled by total assets. Z-score is the sum of ROA and the equity capital to total assets ratio
divided by the standard deviation of ROA. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board. Female CEO is a dummy variable equal
to one if the bank has a female CEO. Board Size (ln) is the log of the number of board members. Board Independence is the proportion of independent
directors on the board. Political Connection is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one government representative on the board.
Institutional Ownership is the percentage of total equity held by the institutional investors. Widely Held is a dummy equal to one if there is no owner
with>10% of voting rights and zero otherwise. HHI stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared
ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. Size is the log of total assets. LRMES is the expected loss of equity value whenever a
broad index falls by 40% over the following 6 months. MTB Ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Capital Ratio is
the ratio of total equity capital to total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the
ratio of total customer deposits to total assets. GDP growth is the annual percentage growth rate of the GDP. All variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. p-Values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 5
Gender composition and public bailouts: summary statistics.
Panel A Number of female directors Gender diversity (%) Bailouts
Country Average Max Average Max
Austria 3 8 15.2185 33.3333 8
Belgium 2 5 12.8940 31.2500 13
Denmark 2 5 16.9020 41.6666 9
Finland 2 4 26.6071 50.0000 0
France 3 9 20.9196 53.8461 6
Germany 3 7 16.4705 35.0000 8
Greece 1 3 8.4979 25.0000 31
Ireland 2 3 13.2488 25.0000 9
Italy 1 7 11.6356 50.0000 29
Luxembourg 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0
Netherlands 1 4 18.5919 60.0000 5
Portugal 1 3 5.3422 20.0000 5
Spain 2 6 12.2967 40.0000 15
Sweden 4 9 29.5252 52.9412 0
United Kingdom 2 8 14.9748 42.1053 13
Panel B Number of female directors Gender diversity (%) Bailouts
Year Average Max Average Max
2005 1 6 9.0000 31.5789 0
2006 1 5 8.8898 33.3333 0
2007 1 6 8.6698 37.5000 0
2008 1 7 9.8901 41.6666 26
2009 1 6 9.7962 36.3636 45
2010 2 7 11.5482 45.4545 18
2011 2 7 12.2151 41.1764 22
2012 2 8 14.6839 47.0588 27
2013 2 8 16.5704 50.0000 8
2014 2 7 20.8372 50.0000 1
2015 3 8 24.3486 50.0000 0
2016 3 9 27.0682 53.8461 3
2017 4 9 28.0139 60.0000 1
This table presents the descriptive statistics about female directors and bailouts by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B). Each panel reports the
average and maximum number of female directors on the board (Number of female directors) and the average and maximum percentage of the
board represented by female directors (corresponding to our variable Gender Diversity) and the number of bailouts (Bailouts).
Fig. 1. Average Gender Diversity over the Sample Period (2005–2017).
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average) of the total number of board members, while Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal have an average value of Gender Diversity
below 10%. The country that received the largest number of bailouts is Italy, followed by Greece. This is likely to be a result of the
“feedback effect” between sovereign debt risk and the risk of the banking sector during the Eurozone crisis.
Fig. 1 and Panel B of Table 5 show a remarkable increase in the percentage of female directors on banks' boards over the sample
period. This is line with the initiatives of the European Commission and Member States to boost and ensure better gender equality in
companies' boards in terms of female representation.21 The total number of bailouts over the sample period is 151. The number of
bailouts is particularly high for the years 2009 (45) and 2012 (27), and after 2013, there are only five bailouts (2 capital injections
and 3 guarantees).
Do rescued banks differ from nonrescued banks? Table 6 provides the results of the two-sided t-tests for the differences in means
of a set of variables that may be related to the probability of receiving a public bailout. We provide the results separately for the pre-
bailouts period (2005–2007) and the bailouts period (2008–2017) and separately for capital injections, credit lines, and guarantees.
In addition to the t-tests already reported, we conduct the Wilcoxon test to allow for the possibility that the normality assumption
does not hold in our sample. The untabulated results (reported in Supplementary Appendix A) confirm the results reported in Table 6.
Our results suggest that nonrescued banks have, on average, a higher value for Gender Diversity than rescued banks in the bailouts
period. For the pre-bailouts period, the difference in the means is statistically nonsignificant. Consistent with TBTF considerations,
the rescued banks are significantly larger than nonrescued banks in both periods. These results are consistent with the argument that
large banks are more likely to attract public support than small banks (Dam and Koetter, 2012) because of their stronger spill-over
effects in the case of liquidation (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). As expected, this result is also confirmed by the differences in
means for LRMES but only for the bailouts period (for the pre-bailouts period this is true only for capital injections).
Our results also show that the nonrescued banks have a higher MTB Ratio both in the pre-bailouts period and in the bailouts period
than the rescued banks. Furthermore, the rescued banks tend to have a lower Deposits Ratio than the rescued peers in the bailouts period
(but not in the pre-bailouts period), which is consistent with the view that deposits provide a stable source of funding for banks (Bruno
et al., 2018); thus, banks with a low Deposits Ratio are more likely to suffer from a lack of liquidity during a crisis. Unsurprisingly, the
nonrescued banks have, on average, better performance (proxied by Tobin's Q and MTB Ratio) and lower riskiness (proxied by Z-score)
than the rescued banks, although for Z-score, the results are significant only for the crisis period. Comparing the results for the bailouts
period with those for the pre-bailouts period, we notice that the crisis weakened the performance (in terms of ROA, Tobin's Q and MTB
Ratio) of both rescued and nonrescued banks but affected the rescued banks more severely. Similar results are confirmed in Brei and
Gadanecz (2012). Since dividend payout ratios may be related to risk-shifting incentives (Acharya et al., 2011), we also report the
results for t-tests based on the dividends to equity ratio (DPE), as well as for its logarithmic form. On average, the nonrescued banks have
higher DPE and DPE (ln) than rescued banks during the crisis. A possible explanation for this result is that the rescued banks are subject
to increased monitoring intensity from public authorities, which decreases the payout ratios (Onali et al., 2016). Finally, politically
connected banks, as one might expect, are more likely to receive a bailout than other banks.
Fig. 2. Public bailouts over the sample period (2005–2017).
21 For instance, in 2011, the European Commission introduced legislation to improve gender balance in EU-listed companies: http://ec.europa.eu/
newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=46280.
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4. Results
4.1. Probit regressions: results
Table 7 presents the results for the probit regressions for the likelihood that a bank receives a public bailout. To demonstrate that
our results are robust, we present the results with different sets of controls, with and without country, bank, and year FE.
We find that banks with a high percentage of female directors are less likely to receive a bailout than those with a low percentage;
the coefficient on Gender Diversity is statistically significant at the 5% level or 1% level for nine out of the 11 specifications. For the
remaining specifications (column (9) and column (11)), Gender Diversity is significant at the 10% level, and such an increase in the p-
values is due to the low number of observations: in column (9), using bank and year fixed effects leads to a drop in the number of
observations of over 60% with respect to column (1).
Considering the results in column 5, for which we have the lowest value for the marginal effects in the regressions on the whole
sample, the magnitude of the marginal effects suggests that an increase by one standard deviation in Gender Diversity (0.1203)
decreases the probability of a bailout by approximately 2.44% (0.2025*0.1203).
The coefficient on Size is positive in all regressions where it is included, but it is significant at the 5% level in only three cases. This
result is not unexpected because our sample is mainly composed of large EU banks, and it is also consistent with the previous
literature arguing that Size is a rough indicator of bank systemic importance (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2013) because it is unable to
capture the potential distress costs and negative externalities associated with bank default.
In line with Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), we find that high profitability, proxied by ROA, reduces the probability of a public
bailout. Capital Ratio is also negatively related to the probability of obtaining a bailout. The coefficients for Tier 1 Ratio are also
negative, but they tend to be insignificant. The fact that the coefficients on Tier 1 Ratio are insignificant in all cases but one, but
Capital Ratio is significant in all regressions, suggests that authorities may consider Capital Ratio to be an informative variable when
deciding which bank should be bailed out. The other control variables, including Institutional Ownership, Political Connection and
corporate governance variables (such as Board Independence), are insignificant in all regressions, apart from Board Size (ln), which is
significant at the 1% level in column (11).
The results for the control variables are, therefore, consistent with our expectations: better-capitalized and profitable banks are
less likely to obtain a public bailout than other banks. However, gender diversity on the board also plays a key role.
4.2. Robustness checks
Table 8 reports the results of the robustness checks. We start by running regressions for two different subsamples, a subsample for
which Political Connection is equal to zero (column 1) and a subsample for which it is equal to one (column 2), to understand whether
our main results are driven by politically connected banks. Discarding banks for which Political Connection is equal to zero results in a
reduction in the number of observations of over 90%. In columns (3) and (4), we consider the impact of Gender Diversity on the
probability of a bailout for t + 1 and t + 2, respectively. The coefficient on Gender Diversity in column (3) is still negative and
significant, but for column (4) it becomes insignificant. Because we are lagging all explanatory variables, including Gender Diversity,
these results suggest that the impact of Gender Diversity on Public Bailout lasts for approximately 2 years and then disappears.
In specifications (5)–(7), we report the results of the PSM regressions. The results for Gender Diversity are unaltered and suggest that
the impact of Gender Diversity is still negative and significant, regardless of whether we include country fixed effects or bank fixed effects.
Table 8
Robustness checks for the regressions on Public Bailouts.
Dependent variable:
Bailouts













PSM with bank FE
Gender Diversityt−1 −1.9945⁎⁎ −7.2796⁎ −1.8012⁎⁎ −1.0580 −2.7147⁎⁎⁎ −2.2354⁎⁎ −4.5479⁎⁎⁎
(−2.0899) (−1.8380) (−2.0989) (−1.1703) (−2.9365) (−2.3006) (−2.5853)
Marginal effect a a −0.2099 a −0.3426 −0.2631 −1.0010
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 785 62 794 713 833 766 443
Banks 92 11 92 91 100 92 49
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Year FE No No No No No No No
Bank FE No No No No No No Yes
This table shows the results of the probit regressions and probit regressions with PSM. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if
a bank receives a bailout during the sample period (2005–2017) and zero otherwise. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the
board. The controls include Size, Capital Ratio, Tobin's Q, Tier 1 Ratio, ROA, HHI, GDP growth, Female CEO, Board Independence, Board Size (ln),
Institutional Ownership and Political Connection (except for columns (1) and (2)). Constants are included but not reported. All variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ⁎⁎⁎p < .01, ⁎⁎p < .05, ⁎p < .1. a: The matrix has missing values; thus, the marginal effects cannot be reported.
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Fig. 3 reports the kernel density estimates of the estimated propensity score for the treatment (banks with high Gender Diversity) and
control sample (banks with low Gender Diversity) before and after the matching. The graphs clearly suggest that matching improves the
degree of similarity between the two subsamples, and a strong overlap exists between the treated group and the control group with
respect to the covariates that we use for the matching strategies. In the untabulated results (see Supplementary Appendix C), we show
the results of diagnostics tests for propensity score matching. Before matching, the score for the treatment group is 1.1412, which is
larger than that of the control group (0.9814). After matching, the scores for the treated and control groups are 1.1412 and 1.1403,
respectively. The t-test for the equality of the means is significant before matching but insignificant after matching, and the bias drops
from 44.5% to 0.3%. The results suggest that the control group does not differ from the “treated” group.22
The untabulated results of the IV-probit regressions (Supplementary Appendix D) confirm our main inferences. The coefficients on Gender
Diversity are again negative and significant at the 5% level, except for one specification for which the coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
At the bottom of the table, we report the results for the diagnostic tests. The p-value of the Wald Test under the null hypothesis of no
endogeneity of Gender Diversity is lower than 5%, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of Gender Diversity can be rejected.
Thus, the coefficient estimates for these four specifications are inconsistent with those of the probit regressions without IVs. The instruments
employed are strong, as shown by the Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap test statistics. For specification (10), for which we include both IVs
in the first-stage regression, we also report the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which suggests that the instruments are valid.
To increase the robustness of our results, we provide further evidence of the impact of political connections and institutional
ownership on the relationship between Gender Diversity and Public Bailout.
First, we construct three additional proxies for political connections: i) Representatives is a dummy variable equal to one if there is
more than one government representative on the board; ii) Government members is the proportion of directors that are government
representatives; and iii) Government stake is the percentage of total equity held by the government (excluding stakes classified as a
bailout). In these regressions, we include all the controls used thus far. For the sake of brevity, these results are untabulated, but we
report them in the Supplementary Appendix E (columns (1)–(4)).
Second, we perform additional regressions to allow for the effect of different types of institutional investors. The untabulated
results (reported in Columns 5–9 of the Supplementary Appendix E) confirm that the relation between Gender Diversity and Public
Fig. 3. Balancing Test for the PSM.
This figure reports the performance of the balancing test between high-gender diversity banks (treated group) and low-gender diversity (control
group) banks for the sample before matching (Panel A) and after matching (Panel B).
22 The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, a measure of the goodness-of-fit of the PSM estimation, is approximately 0.748.
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Bailout is not affected by the presence of institutional investors. We also find that the presence of hedge funds in the ownership
structure of a bank is negatively related to the probability of receiving a public bailout.
Third, we run robustness checks related to our sample period. Thus far, we report regressions for the full sample period
(2005–2017). However, after 2013, we had only five bailouts in our sample. To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by
these five bailouts, we run our main regressions again, considering only the subperiod 2005–2013. Even during this shorter sample
period, the probability of a public bailout in our sample varies over time. For example, in 2009, the probability is 31%; then, it drops
to 24% in 2012, and in 2016, it is 2%. This occurs because rescue programs are a temporary tool used for the management of
generalized distress in the whole financial sector (Stolz and Wedow, 2010; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). The untabulated results
for the subperiod 2005–2013 (see Supplementary Appendix F) are similar to those obtained for the full sample period.
Finally, contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on LRMES tends to be insignificant. To investigate the potential cause of this
result, we consider a different measure of systemic risk,MES (Vallascas et al., 2017), rather than LRMES. We again consider the subperiod
up to 2013 because of data availability from V-lab's website for MES (for later years, only LRMES is reported). For comparability, we use
the subperiod up to 2013 even for the regressions with LRMES. These findings are untabulated but reported in the Supplementary
Appendix G (LRMES) and H (MES). For LRMES, although the coefficient enters all regressions with a positive sign, it is significant at the
5% level in four cases out of ten. The coefficient on MES, on the other hand, is positive and significant in nine out of ten specifications.
These results suggest thatMES is a better proxy for systemic risk than LRMES when predicting public bailouts. In all regressions provided
in the Supplementary Appendix G and H, the coefficient on Gender Diversity remains negative and statistically significant.
4.3. Duration models
In this section, we test our main hypotheses by using survival data analysis. The results in Table 9 complement the results in
Tables 7 and 8. The coefficient on the hazard ratio for Gender Diversity is less than one and statistically significant in all specifications,
suggesting that banks with a high value for Gender Diversity in the pre-bailouts period are less likely to receive a bailout during the
financial crisis than the other banks.23 In column (2), we control for the presence of a female CEO in the bank, while in column (3),
we control for other board characteristics. The results for these tests remain unaltered.
In columns (4) and (5), we employ a duration model estimating the probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number
of calendar days from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the sample period.24 In column (5), we implement a parametric survival
model for which the baseline hazard function has the Weibull form because the proportional-hazards assumption25 does not hold
Table 9
Timing of public bailouts and gender diversity.
Proportional hazard models
Public Bailout Public Bailout Public Bailout Public Bailout Public Bailout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender Diversityprecrisis 0.9390⁎⁎⁎ 0.9390⁎⁎⁎ 0.9469⁎⁎ 0.9030⁎⁎⁎ 0.9783⁎⁎
(−3.0618) (−3.0618) (−2.5038) (−2.8376) (−2.3922)
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female CEO No Yes No No No
Board size (ln) No No Yes No No
Board Independence No No Yes No No
Proportional Hazard Model Semi-Parametric Semi-parametric Semi-Parametric Semi-Parametric Parametric
Intercept No No No No Yes
PH-test (Chi-Squared) 7.47 7.47 7.63 32. 51⁎⁎⁎ (N/A)
Rescued banks 43 43 43 46 46
Banks 105 105 105 105 105
Duration Years Years Years Days Days
Log-Likelihood −117.71 −117.71 −116.95 −106.90 −47.68
The table shows the results of Cox (1972) and Weibull regressions (column 5), where the dependent variable is the probability that a bank has
received a bailout since the start of the financial crisis (2007). The sample period ends in 2017. The predictors are expressed as averages and
calculated across the pre-bailouts period. The variable of our interest is Gender Diversity. The controls are Size, Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio, Deposits
Ratio, Female CEO, Board Independence, and Board Size. Female CEO is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is a woman and zero
otherwise. Board Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Board Size (ln) is the natural logarithm of the number of
board members. In columns (4) and (5), we estimate the Cox hazard model (1972), where the duration is measured in number of days. All
regressions include the country fixed effects (Country FE). We report the Hazard Ratio for ease of interpretation. PH test stands for the Schoenfeld
residuals test (Schoenfeld, 1982). Robust z-statistics appear in parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎p < .01, ⁎⁎p < .05, ⁎p < .1.
23 For the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate the results for the bank-specific control variables, and these results are available upon request.
24 For the scope of this analysis, we define the starting day of the crisis as 1 January 2007, following Erkens et al. (2012) and Ryan (2008).
25 We check the proportional-hazards assumption using Schoenfeld's (1982) residuals test.
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when we consider the probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number of calendar days. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar across specifications.
In Fig. 4, we provide graphs of the estimated survival functions. In particular, we show graphs separately for countries that experienced
sovereign debt problems during the Eurozone crisis (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and for the whole sample. The graphs show
that for Greek banks, the estimated survival function starts from a lower value (approximately 0.2) and decades more rapidly than for the
whole sample. This finding suggests that Greek banks in our sample are likely to receive a bailout earlier than other European banks.
4.4. Amount of public bailouts: Tobit models
Table 10, Panel A shows the results of the IV-Tobit regressions (columns (1)–(6)) and panel Tobit regressions with bank FE (columns
(7)–(9)). The coefficients on Gender Diversity are negative and significant at the 5% level (or better) in six out of nine cases, indicating that
banks with a large percentage of female directors tend to receive a smaller amount of capital injections, credit lines and guarantees as a
percentage of total assets than banks with a small percentage of female directors. The economic magnitude of the results is also substantial.
For example, an increase by one standard deviation in the proportion of women on the board decreases Capital Injections by 0.428 percentage
points (0.0356*0.1203), Credit Lines by 0.022 percentage points (0.0018*0.1203), andGuarantees by 0.457 percentage points (0.038*0.1203).
These values are equal to 12.86%, 1.16%, and 7.02% of the respective means for cases where a bailout occurs.
However, for the regressions with bank FE, the coefficient on Gender Diversity is insignificant for Capital Injections and Guarantees,
but it is significant at the 5% level for Credit Lines.
In Table 10, Panel B, we consider panel Tobit regressions in conjunction with the PSM (columns (10)–(12)), Poisson models with
bank FE (columns (13)–(15)), and population-averaged Poisson models (columns (16)–(18)). The results confirm the negative re-
lationship between Gender Diversity and the size of the public bailouts for Credit Lines and Guarantees26 but not for Capital Injections.
Fig. 4. Proportional Cox hazard models: estimated survival functions.
26 All three coefficients for Credit Lines are significant, and two out of three coefficients for Guarantees are significant.
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5. The mechanism: bank profitability, risk and dividend payout ratios
In this section, we aim to identify the channels through which gender diversity on banks' boards influences the probability of a
public bailout during a financial crisis. We identify three potential channels: bank profitability, bank soundness, and bank dividend
policy. As before, we rely on an IV setup as well as PSM for our inferences.
Table 10
Censored regression models: amount of public bailouts and gender diversity.
Panel A: IV-tobit, Panel tobit
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Capital Injections Credit Lines Guarantees Capital Injections Credit Lines Guarantees Capital
Injections
Credit Lines Guarantees
Gender Diversity −0.5905⁎⁎⁎ −0.2179⁎⁎ −0.9522⁎⁎⁎ −0.5445⁎⁎⁎ −0.2075⁎⁎ −0.9594⁎⁎⁎ −0.0075 −0.1473⁎⁎ −0.2945
(−3.1967) (−2.2245) (−3.4723) (−3.1088) (−2.0076) (−3.4795) (−0.2301) (−2.4316) (−1.3635)
Marginal effects −0.0356 −0.0018 −0.0380 −0.0430 −0.0013 −0.0490 N/A N/A N/A
Observations 916 916 916 741 741 741 810 810 810
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set of Controls 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EU-Sovereign Debt
Crisis
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Banks 103 103 103 77 77 77 78 78 78
Lagged variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Model IV TOBIT IV TOBIT IV-TOBIT IV TOBIT IV TOBIT IV-TOBIT Panel tobit Panel tobit Panel tobit
Panel B: Panel tobit with PSM, fixed-effects Poisson, and population averaged Poisson models
Variables (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Capital
Injections
Credit Lines Guarantees Capital
Injections
Credit lines Guarantees Capital
Injections
Credit Lines Guarantee
Gender Diversity −0.0377 −0.1191⁎⁎ −0.2122⁎ 3.3416 −15.3958⁎⁎ −5.7187⁎ −0.2763 −7.0747⁎⁎⁎ −6.1228⁎⁎⁎
(−0.8525) (−2.2756) (−1.7150) (1.2218) (−2.2198) (−1.8886) (−0.0849) (−2.6328) (−3.1511)
Marginal effects N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Observations 652 652 652 256 162 440 936 936 936
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set of Controls 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
US-Mortgage
Crisis
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EU-Sovereign
Debt Crisis
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Banks 73 73 73 29 17 47 104 104 104






















This table shows the results of the IV-Tobit models, panel Tobit with bank fixed effects (Honorè, 1992), fixed-effects Poisson models, and population-
averaged Poisson models. The dependent variables are Capital Injections, Credit Lines, and Guarantees. Capital Injections is the amount of equity capital
injections received by a bank scaled by total assets. Credit Lines is the amount of the credit lines received by a bank scaled by total assets. Guarantees
represents the amount of the guarantees received by a bank scaled by total assets. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board.
Set of Controls 1 includes Size, Capital ratio, Tobin's Q, Tier 1 Ratio, ROA, HHI, GDP growth, Female CEO, Board Size (ln), Board Independence, Political
Connection, and Institutional Ownership. Set of Controls 2 includes LRMES, Capital ratio, Tobin, Tier 1 Ratio, ROA, HHI, GDP growth, Female CEO, Board
Size (ln), Board Independence, Political Connection, and Institutional Ownership. All regressions include US-Mortgage Crisis dummy (which is a dummy
that takes the value of one if the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008) and EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis (which is a dummy that takes the value
of one if the observation refers to the years of 2010 and 2012). For the Panel Tobit regressions, the variables are not lagged because this would be
inconsistent with the assumptions of the model. N/A stands for not available because the marginal effects cannot be estimated for panel Tobit and
panel Poisson models. Constants are included but not reported. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. Robust z-statistics appear in parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎p < .01, ⁎⁎p < .05, ⁎p < .1.
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5.1. Dependent variables
To test the profitability channel, we use two measures that have been widely employed in the finance literature: Tobin's Q and ROA. To
investigate the risk channel, following Dam and Koetter (2012), we consider a proxy for credit risk, the nonperforming loans ratio, calculated
as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL Ratio). Second, consistent with the recent literature on risk-shifting, we employ Z-score,
which is an accounting-based and backward-looking proxy for bank soundness, and it is calculated as the ratio of the ROA plus the ratio of
equity to total assets divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. To test the dividend-policy channel, we employ the dividends to equity
ratio, DPE, in the main specifications as the dependent variable. Since Z-score and the DPE are skewed to the right (Onali, 2014; and Onali
et al., 2016), we report the results even using the log transformation for Z-score (Z-score (ln)) and the DPE (DPE (ln)).
5.2. Model specifications
To explore the mechanism behind the relation between gender diversity on banks' boards and the probability of receiving a
bailout, we run three sets of regressions based on the following equation:
=Y f Gender Diversity Controls( , )i t i t i t, , 1 , 1 (5)
where Yi,t is the variable of interest of our hypotheses (profitability, risk and dividends), and Controls is a vector of bank-level and
macroeconomic control variables. We cluster the standard errors at the bank level, and we run the regressions with different sets of
controls: Size, Widely Held, Capital Ratio, Deposits Ratio, HHI, GDP growth, Female CEO, Board Independence, Board Size (ln), Political
Connection, and Institutional Ownership.
In addition to using OLS regressions, we employ PSM and IV models to allow for potential endogeneity for three reasons. The PSM
regressions are based on the same variables as those used for the probit regressions (see Table 8). Then, we run OLS regressions after
matching, considering the same sets of controls employed for the OLS regressions. For the IV regressions, we employ Female Parti-
cipation Rate as an instrument. More precisely, we run three sets of regressions based on:
=Y f Gender Diversity ControlsSecond stage: ( , )i t i t i t, , 1 , 1.
=Gender Diversity f IV ControlsFirst stage: ( , )i t i t i t, 1 , 1 , 1 (6)
To understand whether the impact of Gender Diversity on the dependent variables occurs after several years, we run the OLS, PSM,
and IV regressions on Yi,t+1 and Yi,t+2.
5.3. Mechanism regressions: results
We report the results of the OLS regressions without PSM in Table 11. Panel A reports the results for Tobin's Q, ROA and NPL Ratio;
Panel B reports the results for Z-score, DPE and Z-score (ln); and Panel C reports the results for DPE (ln) only. The results suggest that
Gender Diversity increases Tobin's Q, and the coefficient on Gender Diversity is larger for t + 1 and t + 2 than for t. The coefficients on
Gender Diversity in the regressions for ROA, however, are insignificant, and therefore, the evidence regarding the impact of female
directors on profitability is not very robust. The results also show that Gender Diversity does not have a significant impact on risk
(proxied by NPL Ratio, Z-score or Z-score (ln)). There is, however, some evidence that Gender Diversity has a positive impact on
dividend payout ratios; this is consistent with the previous literature (Chen et al., 2017; Ye et al., 2019). Among the control variables,
it seems that Political Connection increases Z-score, while GDP growth increases ROA and DPE. Moreover, Institutional Ownership has a
positive impact on DPE (ln), while Female CEO has a negative impact on DPE (ln).
Table 12 reports the results of the OLS regressions in conjunction with PSM. The results reported in Panel A for Tobin's Q, ROA and
NPL Ratio mirror those reported in Table 11, Panel A: Gender Diversity has a positive impact on Tobin's Q but not on ROA or NPL Ratio.
Panel B of Table 12 reports the results for Z-score, DPE and Z-score (ln). These results are consistent with those reported in Panel B of
Table 11: the results for DPE suggest that Gender Diversity increases payout ratios, while the results for Z-score and Z-score (ln) indicate
that Gender Diversity does not affect risk. Similar to what is reported in Table 11, the impact of Gender Diversity on DPE is stronger for
t + 1 and t + 2 than for t. Consistent with the results reported in Table 11, Political Connection increases Z-score, and GDP growth increases
profitability and payout ratios. In the untabulated results (Supplementary Appendix I), the IV regressions provide similar results.
These findings are in line with management theories arguing that a more diverse board might improve profitability (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009). These theories support the hypothesis that female directors can help a firm by attracting valuable resources and
improving profitability (Hillman et al., 2002), and they also corroborate the findings reported by Berger et al. (2014).27 Our results
for DPE corroborate the hypothesis that Gender Diversity decreases agency costs because female directors are better monitors than
their male counterparts (Chen et al., 2017). The results for the NPL Ratio and Z-score suggest that Gender Diversity does not affect bank
risk and that there is no evidence of a risk channel.
We also investigate the channel through which Gender Diversity increases the payout ratios and decreases the probability of a
bailout. Similar to Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) and Onali et al. (2016), we employ a 3-stage least squares (3SLS) framework to
27 Berger et al. (2014) suggest that although female directors represent a minority on banks' boards (European Commission, 2012a, 2012b), they
are not marginalized on male-dominated boards.
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examine the interlinkages across the following variables: Public Bailout, ROA, DPE (ln), and Gender Diversity (instrumented by Female
Participation Rate). In the untabulated results (Supplementary Appendix J), we show that Gender Diversity increases ROA, which in
turn leads to a higher payout ratio. A high payout ratio reduces the probability of a bailout, which is consistent with the agency cost
hypothesis. Ceteris paribus, large dividends reduce the amount of free cash flow available to bank managers; this free cash flow can
be used for investments in projects with a negative net present value (Jensen, 1986), such as loans that are unlikely to be repaid. Such
a monitoring effect of dividends can reduce the agency costs of bank executives and bank shareholders. Our results thus suggest that
gender diversity can reduce agency costs because female directors tend to pay higher dividends than their male counterparts. This can
in turn decrease the probability of a bailout.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
This paper is the first attempt to estimate the impact of gender diversity on banks' boards on the probability that banks need a
public bailout. While recent academic papers investigate the role of gender diversity on banks' boards (Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and
Faff, 2013; Berger et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Palvia et al., 2015; Farag and Mallin, 2017; Arnaboldi et al., 2018), there is
currently no evidence about the impact of gender diversity on banks' boards on the likelihood of a public bailout.
Using a hand-collected dataset on a large sample of European banks, we show that gender diversity reduces the probability of a
public bailout, although this effect is economically moderate in comparison with the impact of the overall degree of systemic risk of
an institution. Moreover, conditional on a public bailout happening, the amount of public funding received, as a percentage of bank
assets, decreases as the percentage of women on the board increases.
An investigation of the drivers of such a phenomenon suggests that gender diversity has a positive impact on bank performance
(proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA). Moreover, gender diversity correlates positively with dividend payout ratios, suggesting a decrease
in agency costs, which consequently leads to a lower probability of a bailout. However, we do not find evidence that gender diversity
decreases bank risk. Our results are robust to a variety of econometric methods, including PSM and IV-estimation methods.
In light of recent reforms in several EU countries regarding gender quotas and the current debate about the need to understand
and enhance corporate governance mechanisms in banks (De Larosiere Group, 2009; Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance,
BCBS, 2010), our results provide important insights into the role of female directors in bank conduct: these findings may be inter-
preted as evidence showing that female directors exert stronger monitoring efforts than their male counterparts (Adams and Ferreira,
2009; Chen et al., 2017; Evgeniou and Vermaelen, 2017), leading to higher profitability and lower agency costs. Therefore, our
results support the aim of the European Commission to further improve gender balance on corporate boards. Despite the improve-
ments made over the last decade, the average proportion of women on the board in our sample is well below the target of 40% to be
achieved by 2020 proposed by the European Commission for listed companies (COM 2012/614). Improving gender diversity in
boards might be especially important for firms in countries with weak institutional environments (Ye et al., 2019). Our findings also
provide information on how gender diversity influences the potential cost of different types of bailouts for taxpayers. As far as we
know, this is the first paper that provides an estimation of such costs.
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